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Abstract 
 
To achieve the goal to have a proportion of renewable energy corresponding to 20 
per cent of total energy consumption set by the EU's Renewable Energy Directive, 
the amount of renewable energy has to be increased substantially. Finland has 
mostly invested in wind power and biofuel to meet the requirements. However, 
solar power has potential to have a bigger part in renewable energy generation, 
despite Finland’s geological location. Germany has successfully increased the 
amount of renewable energy by using solar power. As Southern Finland receives 
about the same amount of sunlight as Northern Germany, it makes sense to start 
considering supporting solar power generation.  
 
In this bachelor’s thesis, I will be inspecting the profitability of solar power 
generation in households in Finland. The calculations will include solar PV systems 
of two sizes; 3 kWp and 5 kWp. Because solar PV systems are not profitable 
without support system, I will be introducing Feed-in Tariff –policy from Germany 
and Tradable Green Certificate –policy from Sweden. The required amount of 
subsidies will be estimated for both feed-in tariff system and tradable green 
certificates system. Then I will proceed to compare these two policies to determine 
which one would be the most efficient one to increase renewable energy production 
in Finland.  
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1. Introduction 	
 
The European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive has set national targets for the 
proportion of renewable energy. By 2020 the goal is to have a proportion of 
renewable energy corresponding to 20 per cent of total energy consumption. To 
achieve this goal, it is essential to implement a support system for renewable energy 
generation in Finland.  
 
Enough households in Finland are not participating to the generation of electricity 
from renewable sources. Investing in a solar PV system is not attractive as its costs 
exceed the possible revenues incurred from selling electricity to energy companies.  
With a support system, households would be encouraged to participate in the goal 
to increase renewable energy.  
 
Among other renewable sources, solar power should be considered as a potential 
source of electricity in Finland. The amount of sunlight Southern Finland receives 
in a year is close to the amount Northern Germany receives. The Feed-in Tariff 
system in Germany has accomplished a huge increase in household’s solar power 
generation. With similar kind of environmental conditions, Finland could benefit 
from encouraging households to start generating electricity from solar power. 
 
Another support system I have included to this paper is Tradable Green Certificate 
system. Sweden is currently using it to increase the proportion of renewable energy. 
The goal is to compare FIT and TGC –policies to conclude which one is more 
efficient in increasing renewable energy with as low additional costs as possible.  
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2. Electricity Markets and Price Formation 
 
Understanding the principles of electricity markets and how solar power affects 
them is essential for evaluating feed-in tariff and tradable green certificate policies. 
The generation of renewable energy is usually intermittent, so either demand or 
supply has to quickly adapt to the changes in the generation. The demand side 
being rather inelastic for electricity, it is up to the supply side to use load following 
power plants as an adaption mechanism.  
 
The electricity prices for household consumers in Finland consist of the price of 
electric energy (40 %), grid and regional network transmission and distribution 
costs (30 %), and taxes (30%) (Energiateollisuus ry, 2016).  
 
The supply for electricity in Finland is based on Nord Pool’s day-ahead market. In 
the Nord Pool day-ahead trading system, the participators ask and offer bids. 12:00 
CET is the deadline for submitting bids which are then delivered the following day. 
From 00:00 CET the next day, power contracts are physically delivered hour for 
hour according to the contracts agreed. (Nord Pool Spot, 2016) 
 
Figure 1 shows that the supply curve has a market merit order; base-load nuclear 
and coal facilities bid the lowest price. Then CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine) 
and other generation are added.  
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Figure 1. Market Merit Order (Van Kooten, 2011) 
 
When the demand curve D crosses the supply curve, the market price is P, given by 
the marginal open-cycle natural gas plant (NG 2). If NG 2 was unable to deliver 
power, NG 3 would then determine the market price, which would now be P’. All 
electricity generators will receive the price P or P’, depending on the ability to 
deliver power. (Van Kooten, 2011) 
 
When a renewable energy source is introduced to the electricity system as a result 
of a feed-in tariff or a tradable green certificates, the supply curve shifts to the right 
by amount 𝑞 ∗ 𝑞! in the Figure 2. The marginal producer of electricity is now NG 1 
instead of NG 2. The increased supply lowers the price from 𝑃 to 𝑃!. The lower 
price induces consumers to purchase more electricity, as indicated by the arrow. 
(Van Kooten, 2011) 
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Figure 2. Market Merit Order with Renewable Energy (Van Kooten, 2011) 
 
 
3. A Support Model in Germany 
 
In year 2000, German adopted an act called The Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(EEG). The goal is to alter Germany’s energy supply from conventional energy 
sources to renewable ones. The main principle of the act is to provide a fixed 
remuneration for every kilowatt-hour to anyone generating electricity from 
renewable energy sources up to 20 years. (BMWi, 2015) 
 
3.1. Feed-in Tariffs 
 
Feed-in Tariff (FIT) is a generation based fixed price incentive, which an 
independent producer of renewable electricity receives (Chiung-Wen, 2012). It 
usually takes a form of a total price for renewable production. Another option is to 
use an additional premium on top of the electricity market price. (Huber, C. et al., 
2004) The former option is used in Germany. The “EEG surcharge”, which is the 
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difference between the fixed price and the market price for electricity, is passed on 
to the electricity consumers (BMWi, 2015). Another quality of the feed-in tariff is 
that the set tariffs decrease annually for new installations (Clean Energy Wire, 
2016). The reason for including a degressive element is to acknowledge the 
development of technology and thereby lower generation costs over time.  
 
The main reason for FIT is to enhance public willingness to install solar PV systems 
by providing a financial reliability for the producers of renewable electricity 
(Chiung-Wen, 2012). At the moment, the cost of installing a solar PV system 
exceeds the revenues from selling the electricity. This makes the investment 
unprofitable and thus does not promote installation. However, with the 
implemented FIT -policy, it has become profitable for households to generate solar 
power in Germany.  
 
When a FIT -policy is implemented, it is necessary that the FIT value is high 
enough to pay back the investment cost within a reasonable timeframe, such as the 
lifetime of the solar PV installation.  
 
Starting 2017, Germany will replace feed-in tariffs fixed by the government with 
auctions. This means that only the renewable installations that have won a tender 
will receive payments. The aim for this reform is to control how much new capacity 
is added each year and introduce market-based approach into the support system. 
This reform, however, will not affect small renewables installations of under 750 
kilowatt capacity which means that households will still receive the same feed-in 
tariffs. (Clean Energy Wire, 2016) 
 
4. A Support Model in Sweden 
 
Sweden’s electricity certificate market has existed since year 2003. Since year 2012, 
Sweden has had a joint market for electricity market with Norway. A joint market 
will result in a larger number of participants with more cost-effective manner, as the 
renewable energy production investments will be directed to the most favourable 
options. (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat and Energimyndigheten, 2015) 
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Sweden has defined a target of increasing renewable energy production by a total of 
28.4 TWh, which is about 17 per cent of the total generation of energy in Sweden, 
from 2012 to the end of 2020. The purpose of this target is to contribute the 
country’s target in relation to the EU Renewable Energy Directive. The EU’s 
Renewable Directive has set binding national targets to ensure that by 2020, 20 per 
cent of total energy consumption will be from renewable energy in EU.  
 
In Sweden, the market participants who have quota obligation are energy suppliers, 
electricity consumers who use energy produced themselves (if it exceeds 60 MWh 
per year), electricity consumers who buy and use electricity from Nordic Pool Spot 
and energy-intensive industries that are registered by Swedish Energy Agency. 
(Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat and Energimyndigheten, 2015) This means 
that normal households that generate electricity are excluded from the certificate 
markets. Nevertheless, households will be included in the possible TGC market in 
this paper. 
 
4.1. Tradable Green Certificates 
 
Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) is a generation based capacity-driven 
instrument for promoting the installation of renewable energy (Huber, C. et al., 
2004). The instrument is a financial asset that can be traded in the electricity spot 
market. The supplier of renewable energy thus receives the spot price plus the TGC 
price per MWh. (Vogstad, 2003) 
 
They are usually implemented through government to define targets and 
obligations on either consumers or electricity suppliers. Once defined, another 
separate market for renewable electricity is established. The price is then decided 
based on demand, supply and the quota. (Huber, 2004) The certificates can be 
obtained in three different ways. First, they can be obtained from own renewable 
electricity generation. Second, by purchasing renewable electricity and in the same 
time certificates from other generators. Last, by simply purchasing certificates 
without purchasing the actual power. (Haas et al., 2011) The compliance period for 
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certificates is 1 year. If the certificate quota is not met within the time period, the 
obligated has to pay a penalty fee of 150 per cent of the certificate’s value.  
5. The Profitability of Household Solar Generation in Finland 
 
5.1. Levelized Cost of Electricity 
 
Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is the constant price for output incurred from 
generating electricity. The net present value of all expected lifetime costs from the 
plant’s output is divided with net present value of the plant’s lifetime expected 
power output (kWh). Formally, 
 
𝑞! 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸(1+ 𝑟)! = 𝐶!(1+ 𝑟)! ⇒ 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 = 𝐶!(1+ 𝑟)!!!!! 𝑞!(1+ 𝑟)!!!!!  
!
!!!
!
!!!  
 
Where 𝐶! is the cost of production at time period 𝑡, 𝑁 is the total amount of 
periods, 𝑟 is the interest rate, and 𝑞! is the quantity of production. (Liski, 2016) 
 
Solar PV system 3 kWp 5 kWp 
The average consumer 
electricity price (€/kWh) 
0,116 0,116 
LCOE (€/kWh) 0,150 0,121 
 
Table 1. The LCOEs of the 3 kWp and 5 kWp solar PV systems  
 
In table 1 I have calculated the LCOE for two solar PV systems of the sizes 3 kWp 
(kilowatt peak) and 5 kWp. A solar PV system is a power system that generates 
solar power by the means of photovoltaics. It consists of all the necessary 
components to produce solar power, such as solar panels, an inverter and other 
accessories to set up the system. A system of size 3 kWp generates 2684 kWh per 
year and the 5 kWp system generates 4474 kWh per year. The interest rate used to 
calculate the LCOEs is 2 per cent, which is based on the interest rate of 10-year 
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government bond in Finland plus a small risk premium. These calculations are 
made based on the technological assumptions explained in a master’s thesis written 
by Kahola, which are mentioned in the appendix.  
 
LCOE presents a basis of comparison for weighted average costs of different power 
generation technologies (Kost et al., 2013). The LCOE is above the average 
consumer electricity price for both systems. This means that electricity generated 
from solar power is not yet as competitive as electricity from other sources, notably 
nuclear power. Nevertheless, in contrast to the increasing energy prices for fossil 
and nuclear power sources, LCOE of renewable energy technologies have been 
decreasing over time (Kost et al., 2013).  
 
5.2.  The Benefits of Solar Power Generation 
 
5.2.1. Quantity of Solar Power Generation 
 
The main financial benefit from generating own electricity comes from saving the 
costs of buying electricity outside. The main savings comes from not needing to pay 
transmission costs nor taxes.  
 
Depending on the size of the solar PV installation, a household producer is able to 
either consume the produced electricity or sell the excess electricity to an energy 
company. It is estimated that a 3 kWp solar PV system generates about 1208 kWh 
excess electricity per year, whereas a 5 kWp one generates 2684 kWp.  
 
The average selling price of electricity for year 2016 that households receive is 
0,0303 €/kWh, which includes the commission price of 0,0024 €/kWh (Fortum, 
2016) paid to the electricity company. The low price indicates that without any kind 
of incentives or subsidies, a household should only produce electricity as much as it 
can consume itself. Thus, solar PV systems should have smaller capacities to avoid 
any excess electricity. However, the approach to generate less RES-E (electricity 
from renewable energy sources) doesn’t support the goal to increase the amount of 
renewable energy in the total energy consumption.  
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5.2.2. Usage Cost  
 
The installation of a solar PV system has an effect on the value of the building. 
Harjunen and Liski (2014) examine in their paper the lifetime cost of heating in a 
single-family house of average size in Finland (170 m2) with average annual need 
for energy (130 kWh/m2). The usage cost is calculated in figure 2 using the present 
value method for a 25-year time period with discount rates 5 and 15.  
 
Households that generate solar energy have lower usage cost, as the marginal cost 
for electricity generation is zero. The saving in usage cost raises the value of the 
building, and same time the willingness to pay for it. The following equations 
express the effect of usage cost on the price of a building: 𝑄! = 𝛼! − 𝛼!𝑝 − 𝛾𝐶   
 𝑄! is the quantity demanded and p is the price. 𝐶 measures the usage cost over the 
relevant life time with discount factor 𝛿 < 1. When 𝛼! = 𝛾 , there is no myopia 
involved and the change in usage cost transfers completely to the asking price. 
When ∆𝑄! = 0,     ⇒ 𝑝 = !!!! − !!! 𝐶 , and    ⇒ 𝑝 = !!!! − 1 ∗ 𝐶. 
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Figure 2. The usage costs of electric and district heating (Harjunen et Liski, 2014) 
 
This means, that if the usage cost decreases (∆𝐶 < 0), the price 𝑝 (and so the value 
of the building) increases. Of course one must take in to account, that the solar 
power generation cannot completely replace the electricity bought outside and the 
annual need for energy used in the paper written by Harjunen and Liski differs 4100 
kWh/per annum from this paper’s assumed annual energy consumption. However, 
this equation could be applied, when calculating the effect more precisely.  
 
 
5.3. Profitability Measures  
 
The following calculations are based on the financial and technological 
assumptions expressed in a master’s thesis written by Kahola (2015). As there 
hasn’t been a much change in the prices of solar PV panels within a year, it is 
reasonable to use the information as a base for profitability calculations. The 
assumptions are introduced in the appendix. 
 
The profitability of solar PV installations is evaluated with return on investment 
(ROI), real rate of return and net present value (NPV). Based on the calculations, 
without feed-in tariffs, investment subsidies or tradable green certificates, 
generating electricity from solar PV panels isn’t profitable.  
 
Solar PV system 3 kWp 5 kWp 
Return on investment - 37 % - 34 % 
Real rate of return - 50 % - 48 % 
Net present value - 2 992 € - 3 964 € 
 
Table 1. Profitability without any governmental support 
 
Return on investment measures the amount of return on an investment relative to 
the investment cost. The result is expressed as a percentage, which makes it 
comparable to other investments. However, it doesn’t take into account the time 
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value of money, which is why real rate on return is also used as a metric to evaluate 
profitability.  
 
Net present value includes all costs and revenues incurred by a solar PV system. So 
that the time value of money is included, the cash flow is then discounted to this 
moment. In the following calculations, net present value of 0 € or more with a 2 % 
discount rate is considered to be profitable.  
 
5.3.1. Feed-in Tariffs 
 
In the table 2 I have calculated how high the feed-in tariff has to be for a solar PV 
system to be profitable from household’s perspective. It seems that the FIT has to 
be higher for a smaller system to be profitable, if the household is not able to 
consume or store all the generated solar energy.  
 
Solar PV system 3 kWp 5 kWp 
Feed-in tariff (€) 0,164 0,110 
Difference to the average 
consumer electricity price 
(€) 
+ 0,048 - 0,006 
 
Table 2. The required price of FIT 
 
The FIT required for a 3 kWp wouldn’t be efficient way to encourage solar PV 
installations as it is higher than the average consumer electricity price. It would be 
then more efficient to set the FIT to be 0,110 €/kWh, and households would 
purchase larger systems. 
 
Below is a figure, which portrays the development of FIT prices in Germany for the 
years 2000-2016. The prices have fallen substantially during the years, and it seems 
that the required FIT price in Finland is in the same level as the actual price is in 
Germany. 
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 	Figure	3.	FIT	prices	in	Germany	(ct/kWh)	in	time	period	2000-2016	(Wirth,	2016)	
 
 
 
5.3.2. Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) 
 
As with feed-in tariffs, tradable green certificates price is also lower when the size of 
a solar PV system is 5 kWp. As tradable green certificates include the whole 
generation of solar energy, not only the electricity sold to energy companies, the 
prices of TGC are naturally much lower compared to FITs. However, the 
government sets a quota instead of a price for tradable green certificates. The price 
is then formed in the TGC market.  
 
Solar PV system 3 kWp 5 kWp 
TGC (€)/ kWh 0,060 0,048 
 
Table 3. The required price for TGC 
 
For comparison, I have included Figure 3 to illustrate prices of certificates in 
different European countries for years 2002-2008. In Sweden, where the quota was 
16,9 % in year 2010, the price per kWh has been the lowest (varying from 0,02 
€/kWh to 0,04 €/kWh). I have collected the information of TGC policies in Table 
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4. The trend seems to indicate that countries with low quotas usually have higher 
TGC prices.  
 
Figure 3. Value of certificate in different European TGC markets (Haas et al, 2009) 
 
Country UK Belgium 
(Flemish) 
Belgium 
(Wallon) 
Italy Sweden 
Period Start 2002 Start 2002 Start 2002 Start 2001 Start 2003 
Obligation 3% in 2003 
10.4 % in 
2010 
1,2 % in 
2003, 
increasing 
up to 6 % 
3% in 2003, 
increasing 
up to 12 % 
2010 
2 % in 
2002, 
increasing 
annually by 
0,35 % 
7,4 % in 
2003 
16,9 % in 
2010 
 
Table 4. TGC –policy in different European countries (Haas et al, 2009) 
 
In most TGC –policies, the obligation falls on the energy suppliers. In Sweden, the 
quota obligations also include electricity consumers who consume over 60 
MWh/year their own produced energy. (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat and 
Energimyndigheten, 2015) As households’ energy consumption is on much lower 
level, they are excluded from the TGC market.  
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6. The Efficiency of the Support Models  
 
In this section, I will be addressing the efficiency of FIT and TGC –policies 
nationwide. Nations often include renewable energy from different sources and all 
energy producers, not just households. Thus it is more sensible to examine the 
policies in a larger perspective.  
 
The consensus of the most efficient support policy has not yet been reached. 
However, it seems that most scientific studies favour the FIT -policy. These 
different studies evaluate the policies based on the incurred additional costs and the 
growth of RES-E generation. 
 
6.1 Theoretical Modelling of the Support Policies 
 
Menanteau et al. examine the policies from a theoretical and practical point of 
views. With FIT –policy, producers have an incentive to produce the amount of 
energy so that the marginal cost of producing equals the feed-in tariff. This is 
portrayed in the Figure 4. When the feed-in tariff is 𝑃!", the generated amount is 𝑄!"#. 
  
 
Figure 4. Feed-in tariffs (Menanteau et al., 2003) 
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Of course, all producers receive the same FIT regardless their marginal production 
costs. The difference in costs leads to the attribution of economic rent. The cost of 
reaching the objective is 𝑃!"𝑥𝑄!"#. 
 
The TGC –policy favours the most efficient technologies. As producers have 
different marginal production cost curves, tradable green certificates enables quotas 
to be allocated in an efficient way. If every producer had the same obligation as 
others, different marginal costs would incur and thus would increase inefficiency. 
(Menanteau et al., 2003) 
 
The operation of green certificate markets is portrayed in Figure 5. Two producers, 𝐴 and 𝐵, have different marginal cost curves. Producer A has higher marginal 
production costs than producer 𝐵 has. By trading certificates, 𝐴 limits their 
production to 𝑄! and purchases certificates at the equilibrium price 𝑝 to reach the 
target 𝑞. Producer 𝐵 increases production to 𝑄!, and sells the surplus certificates at 
the price 𝑝. The possibility of trade reduces the cost of achieving overall objective (𝑄 = 𝑄! + 𝑄! = 2𝑞), shown by the shaded area. (Menanteau et al., 2003) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Operation of green certificate markets (Menanteau et al., 2003) 
 
Haas et al. explain that the acceptance of support policy by consumers and 
investors is relevant. Thus it is important to analyse what are the additional costs 
imposed on electricity consumers, when a support policy is implemented. The 
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objective is to minimise the additional costs. The direct costs that stem from 
implementing the system consist of the producer surplus, the generation costs 
minus the revenues from the sale in the conventional electricity market. It is also 
possible to subtract the avoided external costs, if they can be determined.  
 
The producer surplus under TGC and FIT –policies is portrayed separately in the 
figures below. The cost curve is assumed to be steep, which indicates that some 
RES-E technologies are more efficient than others. This causes some renewable 
electricity generation to have lower costs than the others. This has the same logic as 
the principle of market merit order.  
 
Figures 6 and 7. Producer surplus under TGC (left) and FIT (right) –policies when 
the cost resource curve is steep (Haas et al., 2011) 
 
In Figure 6, the marginal price of the most expensive technology sold, 
corresponding to the target, determines the price for TGC. Thus, a RES-E 
generator would receive the price of TGC (i.e. P) and the market price. The shaded 
area portrays the surplus, which producers receive. From the figure one can see that 
a high uniform price will result in windfall profits for low-cost technologies. High 
windfall profits result in higher additional costs to the electricity consumers, who 
will in the end pay them.  
 
In Figure 7, Haas et al. have used technology-specific premium feed-in tariffs 
instead of normal feed-in tariffs. Now the producer surplus is considerably smaller, 
opposed to the surplus under the TGC –policy. With normal feed-in tariffs, the 
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figure would look essentially the same as with TGC –policy (if government decided 
to also support the most expensive RES-E producers). Then the producer surplus 
would theoretically be identical as under the TGC –policy. (Norges vassdrags- og 
energidirektorat and Energimyndigheten, 2015. ) 
 
6.2. Evaluating the Impact of the Support Models 
 
The support of incentive programmes is vital to promote electricity generation from 
renewable sources. RES-E generation is not yet efficient enough to develop 
independently as long as the negative externalities resulting from conventional 
energy sources are not internalised. However, during the last 20 years, these 
support systems have made it possible for RES-E technology to become more 
competitive with conventional technologies. It is important to compare the different 
support systems to achieve the highest possible benefit from the additional costs 
these systems impose on electricity consumers. The comparison will be done based 
on the incentive to stimulate renewable electricity generation, incentive to lower 
generation costs and incentive to innovate.  
  
One of the reasons why FIT –policy has stimulated electricity production from 
renewable sources is the prospect of obtaining high return on investment offered by 
relatively high prices levels. With fixed and high prices, the market risk is non-
existent to the investors. Conversely to the FIT –policy, the support mechanism for 
renewable energy development are related to electricity price changes. (Menanteau 
et al., 2003) This gives more volatility to the prices of green certificates, and 
consequently imposes a market risk to the investors. However, market risk could be 
reduced by including a floor and a ceiling price to control the volatility of the 
certificate prices.  
 
Feed-in tariffs have been proved to be costly in terms of subsidies based on the 
experiences in Germany. When feed-in tariffs are not technology-specific, it can be 
hard to avoid causing excessive amount of windfall profit to the RES-E generators. 
The resources would then be allocated inefficiently because of the lack of market 
competition and the differential renewable electricity generation costs. However, 
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Germany has incorporated a decreasing element based on the level of technology. 
This limits the surplus to the producers.  
 
Another weakness of feed-in tariffs is the absent incentive to lower the cost of 
generating electricity from renewable resources. With degressive feed-in tariffs that 
anticipate progress, the profits can be shared in a more equitable manner. On the 
contrary, green certificates provide an incentive to lower costs. First, the electricity 
produced from renewable sources is sold at the market price, which tends to be 
falling due to deregulation and increased competition. Second, the producers of 
renewable electricity have the pressure of lowering costs due to the green certificate 
market. (Menanteau et al., 2003) 
 
Haas et al. and Menanteau et al. both have the same views regarding the 
administration costs these support systems cause. A FIT –policy can be easily 
implemented and revised to account for new capacities (Haas et al., 2011). 
Menanteau et al. also add that administration costs, such as project preparation and 
selection procedure) are usually less expensive than creating a national trading 
scheme.  
 
Another important quality of a support system is whether it promotes the incentive 
to invest in research and development of the electricity generation. In the case of 
feed-in tariffs, the RES-E generators benefit from the entire surplus resulting from 
technological progression. (Menanteau et al., 2003) As the marginal cost is reduced 
due to the progression, the marginal revenue rises and encourages investing more 
heavily on R&D. However, the profits can be controlled by including a degressive 
element into the feed-in tariff.  
 
Because the TGC –policy relies on trade market to allocate the certificates to the 
most efficiently used resources, it tends to promote the most inexpensive energy 
sources. This makes the policy to be one of the most economical support systems, 
which makes it attractive in the economical point of view. Nevertheless, this might 
become a disadvantage in a long-time period, as it might prevent promising, but 
costly, technologies from receiving investments. (Menanteau et al., 2003)  
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7. Future Prospects 
 
As there isn’t yet a support system similar to FIT or TGC –policies in Finland, 
there might be a lot of unused potential to develop more efficient technology. 
Germany has already showed how an all-inclusive support system encourages 
companies to invest more in research and development. The investments have bore 
fruit as the prices of the solar PV systems have decreased enormously over the 
years. Finland could benefit from the German technology, but it is important to 
encourage domestic production to achieve sustainable economic growth.  
Another thing to consider is the storing of electricity. Because electricity from 
renewable sources is intermittent, it is essential to invest in the development 
batteries. Right now the batteries used to store electricity are expensive and not 
realistically obtainable for households. However, if the storing technology 
improves, it would mean more stable availability of RES-E, which in turn would 
lessen the market risks, such as electricity price volatility and the intermittent 
supply of RES-E.  
 
Higher self-sufficiency of electricity could be a goal for Finland. Then the supply of 
electricity would not have to be as dependent on the neighbour countries as before. 
This would give more stability and independency to the Finnish electricity markets, 
which would show in the lower electricity prices. 
8. Conclusions 
 
Based on the calculations, households’ generation of solar power is not profitable 
without any kind of support model. The main benefit from generating own 
electricity is saving in the costs of buying electricity outside. Another benefit is the 
decrease in usage costs, which increases the value of the building. The incurring 
costs from the electricity generation however exceed the revenues received from 
selling the excess electricity. It would be more profitable to support larger 5 kWp 
solar PV systems as the required prices for both FIT and TGC are lower than in the 
3 kWp system. The required prices for TGC are remarkably lower than for FIT. 
This can be explained as the fact that the TGC –policy includes all of the RES-E 
generated, while FIT –policy only applies to the RES-E sold outside the household. 
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The LCOE for solar power is above the average consumer electricity price. This 
means that solar power isn’t yet as competitive as other electricity sources, notably 
nuclear power. Implementing a support system should encourage investing more 
into research and development, which in turn could lead to more efficient and 
competitive technology.  
 
Theoretically, TGC –policy should be more favourable option, as it is market-based 
and allocates the certificates effectively to the most competitive RES-E generators. 
Nevertheless, it seems that FIT –policy has succeeded in increasing the renewable 
electricity generation and giving incentive to invest in potential technology. This 
has come with a high price, because the FIT -policy hasn’t been technology-specific 
in Germany. To avoid high additional costs, premium feed-in tariffs should be used 
to cut the costs down.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
This study uses the financial and technical assumptions expressed in a master’s 
thesis written by Kahola (2015). 
 
Technological assumptions  
 
 The size of a system 
 3 kWp 5 kWp 
Solar PV panels   
Life time 25 years 25 years 
Yearly generation of 
electricity 
2684 kWh 4474 kWh 
Yearly decrease in power  0,5 % 0,5 % 
Inverter   
Life time 12,5 years 12,5 years 
End usage of the electricity   
For own consumption 55 % 40 % 
For selling 45 % 60 % 
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Appendix B  
 
Investment costs 
 
 
Solar PV system 
 
3 kWp 
 
5 kWp 
The price of a system (€) (€) 
Solar PV system (including VAT 24%) 4950 7100 
Planning and installation 1 650 1 950 
Tax credit -643 -778 
Total cost   
Without tax credit 6 600 9 050 
With tax credit 5 958 8 273 
 
 
Solar PV system 3 kWp 5 kWp 
The cost of replacement inverter (€) 1133 1333 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 29	
Appendix C 
 
Financial assumptions 
 
 Value Source 
Discounting factor 2 %  
The average consumer 
electricity price 
0,116 € Energiavirasto (2016) 
The price for electricity 
sold outside 
0,0303 € Energiavirasto (2016) 
Tax rate on revenue 0 % Verohallinto (2016) 
Residual value 0 €  
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Appendix D				Cash flows for a 3 kWp Solar PV system 	
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Appendix E			Cash flows for a 5 kWp Solar PV system 	
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